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IRRATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Lynn A. Stout
Georgetown University Law Center
Rational expectations models have become a staple of economic theory and the basis
for a Nobel Prize. This article argues that rational expectations analysis suffers from
potentially fatal flaws that seriously undermine its value in understanding many
market phenomena. Using the example of financial markets, the article illustrates
how the rational expectations approach has worked to obscure, rather than to
illuminate, our understanding of speculation and speculative markets. This misguid-
ance raises problems for law and policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists in recent years have devoted an extraordinary amount of time
and attention to the study of financial markets, in particular the markets for
corporate securities, and for futures, options, and other "derivative" prod-
ucts. One of the most interesting aspects of these markets is their specula-
tive flavor. A surprising number of the individuals and institutions that trade
in securities and derivatives seem to do so in the hope of earning quick
profits by predicting short-term price changes.
Laypersons and lawmakers traditionally have looked upon such short-
term speculative trading with suspicion. In recent years, however, a consen-
sus has developed among academics that the traditional antispeculative
wisdom is misguided, and that speculation, far from working mischief in
markets, actually does much economic good. This theoretical perspective
has begun to influence contemporary law and policy. Thus, the idea that
speculation furthers efficiency has played an important role both in defeat-
ing recent administration proposals to impose a minor tax on short-term
stock trading, and in insulating the burgeoning market for over-the-counter
derivatives from regulatory attack.
Such developments highlight the importance of understanding the con-
flict between economic theory's apparent support for the speculator, and the
layperson's traditional condemnation. In this paper I propose that popular
wisdom and economic wisdom on speculation have diverged because the
prevailing economic theories on speculation-referred to herein as the lish-
hedging and information-arbitrage approaches-do not, in fact, describe the
activity popularly known as "speculation." In many markets, speculative trad-
ing may be better described by an alternative model I call the heterogeneous
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expectations (or HE) approach. The heterogeneous expectations model of
speculation posits that differences in traders' beliefs-that is, subjective bul-
lishness and bearishness-can be a catalyst for trading. Although this plausi-
ble hypothesis provides theoretical support for the populist intuition that
speculation can be socially destructive, modern economic literature curi-
ously neglects the role that subjective disagreement plays in inspiring trad-
ing. A notable exception can be found in the work of the economistjack
Hirshleifer, who during the 1970s proposed models of speculation based on
expectations heterogeneity. But while Hirshleifer's work on speculation was
initially well received, it soon fell into relative obscurity.
I argue that the culprit in this mysterious disappearance appears to have
been a body of work in game theory that critiqued Hirshleifer's approach
as inconsistent with "rational expectations." Rational expectations analysis,
which has become a standard tool of economic analysis, rests on the plau-
sible hypothesis that people making choices anticipate and take into ac-
count the likely future actions of others.1 When applied to the problem of
speculation, however, the rational expectations approach produces a pecu-
liar result: It predicts that bulls and bears should never trade on subjective
disagreement. Although highly implausible, this "no-trade" result appears a
principal cause of economic theorists' failure to embrace Hirshleifer's het-
erogeneous expectations approach.
There is little doubt that rational expectations analysis can offer a variety
of useful insights into human and market behavior. I argue, however, that
at least as applied to speculative behavior, the rational expectations ap-
proach is deeply flawed, both theoretically and empirically. And if the
rational expectations approach is unsound, there is much merit in reviving
Hirshleifer's heterogeneous expectations model.
The point of this exercise in intellectual history is not to suggest hat eco-
nomic analysis is never useful or appropriate. Rather, I offer a cautionary tale
of what can happen when theorists' infatuation with mathematically elegant
models intrudes upon the attempt to describe actual market behavior.
II. PREVAILING ECONOMIC THEORIES OF SPECULATION
The phenomenon known as speculation has proven something of an endur-
ing problem for economic theory. Although economists generally use the
word "speculation" to refer to the purchase of an asset for resale (rather
than for consumption or use as an input in some productive process),
1. For example, Robert Lucas, who was recently awarded a Nobel Prize in economics, used
a rational-choice analysis when lie argued that high unemployment could not be eliminated
through a Keynesian strategy of short-term interest rate cuts because rational employers and
investors would anticipate that such measures would be short-lived. Great Expectations, and




finance literature lacks a generally accepted definition.2 Disagreement over
the meaning of speculation has been mirrored by disagreement over its
normative implications. Where popular opinion has long condemned
speculation as a socially wasteful practice that distorts market prices, eco-
nomic theory applauds speculation as promoting the economic goal of
allocative efficiency. Even economists, however, differ in their interpreta-
tions of how speculation furthers efficiency.3
The ongoing debate over the meaning and consequences of speculation
reflects, in part, a curiously schizophrenic quality found in many contem-
porary theoretical discussions of speculative trading. Academics often refer
to "speculation" as if it were a uniform, monolithic activity. Yet the modern
finance literature in fact offers at least two divergent explanations for why
someone might buy an asset in order simply to resell it.
Perhaps the most time-honored theory explains speculation as a conse-
quence of differential risk aversion. (This view is often associated withJohn
Maynard Keynes and John Hicks, among others).4 According to this risk-
hedging model, speculators are traders who extract profits by dealing on
favorable terms with more risk-averse "hedgers" willing to pay to avoid the
risks of changing prices.
Most modern discussions of speculation make some reference to the
risk-hedging model. There is another explanation of speculative trading,
however, which also appears frequently in the literature. This second ap-
proach, often associated with a classic article by Sanford Grossman and
Joseph Stiglitz,5 describes speculators as careful researchers who invest in
information that allows them to trade on superior terms with less-informed
actors trading for consumption or other nonspeculative reasons. This infor-
ination-arbitrage model accordingly explains peculation as a result of differ-
ences in traders' willingness to purchase information.6
A. Normative Implications of Prevailing Theories
As this brief introduction suggests, the risk-hedging and information-arbi-
trage approaches differ in many respects. Both models share an important
2. Oliver D. Hart & David NI. Kreps, 1diceDestabilizing Speculation, 94J. POL EcoN. 927, 928
(1986). See Martin S. Fridson, Exactly What Do You Mean by Speculation?j. PORTFOLIO MGhf. 29
(Fall 1993).
3. Jeremy C. Stein, Informational Externalities and Wfare-Reducing Speculation, 95J. POL EcoN.
1123 (1987). See Hart & Kreps, supra note 2, at 927 (citing large literature on the question);
infra text accompanying notes 7 and 8 (discussing differing theories of normative conse-
quences of speculation).
4. SeeJohn Maynard Keynes, A TREATISEON MONEY (1930);John R. Hicks, VALUE AND CAPITAL
(1946).
5. See Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On The Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. Rrv. 393 (1980); see also Albert S. Kyle, Informed Speculation with Imperfect
Competition, 56 REv. ECON. STU. 317 (1989).
6. Yet a third approach occasionally found in literature equates speculation with storage of
inventory. According to this model, speculators are traders who make a living by holding
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implication, however: Both imply that speculative trading pmmotes the efficient
allocation of society's scarce resources.
Under the risk-hedging model, this implication arises because such trans-
actions generally leave both parties to a trade better off after the trade than
they were before it. Risk-aversc hedgers are happy to pay speculators to
assume the price risk inherent in holding an inventory, while more risk-neu-
tral speculators are happy to be paid a premium to do so. Thus, risk hedging
fits neatly into the "invisible hand" model of markets where voluntary
exchange is presumed to improve the welfare of both the exchanging
parties and society as a whole.
The information-arbitrage model of speculation relies on a somewhat
different theory of efficiency benefit. Information arbitrageurs' trades are
not, strictly speaking, mutually beneficial: Less-informed traders motivated
by consumption or other nonspeculative motives presumably would prefer
a market in which they did not have to compete at a systematic disadvantage
against arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs nevertheless perform a salutary social
function by identifying mispriced assets and correcting their prices. For
example, the information arbitrageur whose meteorological research indi-
cates there will be a drought next year buys wheat, thus driving up prices.
Farmers respond to higher wheat prices by planting more wheat, thus
reallocating resources to offset the effects of the drought.7
themselves out as willing to buy from - or sell to - other traders willing to suffer the bid-ask
spread that compensates the speculator for the costs and risks of maintaining inventory. In
effect, this liquidity-dealing approach likens speculators to used-car d[ealers who can "buy low
and sell high" because other traders value the convenience they offer. SW, e.g., Hart & Kreps,
supra note 2, at 928 (developing model of consumers and speculators where "speculation' is
synonymous with storage").
Like the risk-hedging model, the liquidity model implies that speculation provides mutual
gains from trade, because consumption traders willingly suffer liquidity dealers' bid-ask
spreads in return for being able to buy and sell quickly and conveniently, while dealers enjoy
reliable profits from providing liquidity.
7. Though often cited, this argument fails to recognize that improved price accuracy is not
enough, alone, to conclude that trading produces a net social benefit. Acquiring and analyzing
information is costly. Information arbitrageurs incur research costs not out of altruism, but
because they extract wealth from the uninformed traders with whom they deal. Thus, unin-
formed traders bear the cost of arbitrageurs' becoming informed, and there is no guarantee that
the social value of more accurate prices exceeds the costs of information arbitrage to unin-
formed traders. Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Ialue of Information and the Reward to
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 561 (1971).
As an example of this point, consider the extreme case of information that allows an
arbitrageur to forecast with certainty that a particular company's assets will be destroyed within
minutes by a meteorite strike. Assume no steps can be taken to prevent, or even alleviate, the
loss. The ability to predict the meteorite strike has no social value, because acquiring the
information does not permit society to allocate resources more efficiently. The prediction
nevertheless has substantial private value to the arbitrageur wlto can extract wealh from
uninformed traders by shorting the company's stock. Tihus, the arbitrageur might spend
substantial resources on meteorite prediction, even though such expenditures are wastefil
from a social perspective.
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The conventional risk-hedging and information-arbitrage models of
speculation thus generally support the claim that speculators contribute to
allocative efficiency, either by offering their counterparties opportunities
for mutually beneficial exchange, or by improving the accuracy of market
prices. Increasing allocative efficiency in turn increases net social welfare.
Hence, economic theory's general enthusiasm for speculators and for
speculation.8
B. Do Prevailing Theories Really Describe "Speculation"?
The risk-hedging and information-arbitrage models outlined above offer
plausible explanations for why someone might buy an asset for no apparent
purpose other than to resell it. Each theory, moreover, likely accounts for
some forms of short-term trading in goods and services. Yet various argu-
ments counsel against assuming that either model describes the behavior
laypersons think of as "speculation."
First, neither approach seems to comfortably fit the popular image of
speculators. The Keynes-Hicks risk-hedging model implies that speculators
are insurance salesmen-hardly the first image that comes to mind at the
mention of the word "speculator." The information-arbitrage model, on the
other hand, can dispense with the element of risk entirely; in theory, truly
superior information ought to allow speculators to reap certain profits.9
(Hence the "information arbitrage" label preferred here.)10
Semantic questions aside, the risk-hedging and information-arbitrage
models of speculation also carry implications inconsistent with two impor-
tant empirical realities of certain markets (in particular, stock markets and
organized futures and options exchanges) that are closely associated with
speculative trading. First, both the risk-hedging and information-arbitrage
models imply that speculation is impossible unless the speculator can find
a willing, nonspeculating counterparty from whom the speculator can ex-
tract trading profits (e.g., a hedger willing to pay to avoid risk, or a con-
sumption buyer unvilling to invest in available but costly information). Yet
the stock market seems to consist largely of speculators trading with other
speculators.11 Second, the risk-hedging and information-arbitrage models
8. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, ECONOMic ANAusis oF LAw 47-48 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing
that speculation "performs a valuable economic function" by improving price accuracy and
allowing mutually beneficial trades between speculators and hedgers).
9. Although these profits might be statistically fisky, they should also be certain. See infra text
and note 14 (risk and uncertainty).
10. Similarly, the possibility that speculators are paid for storing goods over time and
providing liquidity to buyers and sellers seems better captured by the label "dealing" than
"speculating." See supra note 6 (liquiditydealing model).
11. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Secudities Regulation, 81 VA. L REv. 611, 661-67 (1995) (discussing evidence that trading in the
secondary stock market is dominated by actively managed pension and mutual funds that try
to outperform the market by buying and selling securities they perceive to be "mispriced").
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also imply that speculators ought on average to profit from their trades.
Substantial evidence suggests, however, that in both the stock market and
the futures and options exchanges, traders who identify themselves as
profit-seeking speculators on average lose money by trading.12
Yet a third reason to question whether conventional economic thinking
adequately grasps the slippery concept of speculation can be found in
the vast chasm between economists' ideas concerning the social conse-
quences of speculation, and the traditional beliefs of nonexperts. Modern
finance celebrates speculation as a salutary practice that promotes allo-
cative efficiency. But where economic theory praises the speculator, popu-
lar wisdom has long condemned him. In the public eye, speculators are
market parasites whose trading distorts prices and increases the incidence
of poverty.13
What can explain this long-standing and curious divide between econo-
mists' and noneconomists' views of the merits of speculation? The first
instinct of any devoted disciple of economics, of course, is to give the nod
to theory, and to dismiss populist hostility toward speculators as the mis-
taken product of ignorance and envy. I would like to argue the shocking
proposition that in this case, however, it is the theory that is likely mistaken.
The risk-hedging and information-arbitrage models that dominate the eco-
nomic literature on speculation are both fine models, as far as they go.
But they do not describe the phenomenon laypersons refer to when they speak of
"speculation."
III. THE HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS THEORY OF
SPECULATION
The risk-hedging and information-arbitrage models examined above both
explain speculative trades as a consequence of differences among traders:
either differences in their levels of risk aversion (the risk-hedging model), or
differences in their willingness to invest in information (the information-arbi-
12. See id at 664 (actively managed pension funds and mutual fuids that try to achieve
higher returns through short-term trading on average underperform the market); Lester G.
Telser, Why There Are Organized Futures Markets, 24 J. Uiw & Eco*4. 1, 7. 9 (1981) (reviewing
studies finding that traders in futures markets who identify themselves as profit-seeking specu-
lators on average incur losses).
13. This unflattering view is reflected in the fact that hostility toward speculation appears a
fundamental characteristic of American law. A variety of common-law and statutory legal
doctrines work to raise the costs of speculative transactions, confine them to limited venues, or
ban them entirely. Examples include the Commodities Exchange Act; insurance law's rules of
indemnity and insurable interest; the common-law doctrine of champerty: the Securities
Exchange Act's margin requirements and short sales restrictions; and the Internal Revenue
Code's minimum holding period requirement for favorable capital gains treatment of income
from the sale of assets. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives, Differnce Contracts, and the Sodal
Value of Antispeculative Rules (1997) (manuscript on file with the author).
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trage model). There is a third potential difference between traders, how-
ever, that may lie closer to lay notions of speculation. That is differences in
individual traders' subjective expectations.
Economists refer to situations where different individuals hold differing
subjective beliefs about the probability of a future event as situations of
statistical uncertainty.14 Because introducing uncertainty can enormously
compound the difficulty of mathematically modelling behavior, theorists
often simply assume it away.15 In many cases, however, taking account of
uncertainty's effects sheds light on otherwise-puzzling and inexplicable
market phenomena. The phenomenon of speculation may provide just
such a case.16
Consider the following archetypal example of a speculative transaction
inspired by subjective disagreement. Suppose that two risk-averse traders
who neither produce nor consume gold, and who have both thoroughly
researched the gold market, reach differing subjective conclusions as to
whether the market price of gold is likely to rise or fall tomorrow. One
trader-the bull-predicts a 100 percent chance that gold will rise from
today's price of $500 per ounce to $510 per ounce. The other trader-the
bear-disagrees and predicts a 100 percent chance gold will fall to $490.
Given their differing expectations, the bull willingly buys the gold the bear
willingly sells.
This simple example of trading based on subjective disagreement carries
a host of lessons. First, it reveals how agents who share identical consunption
preferences, attitudes toward risk, and willingness to invest in information may
nevertheless voluntarily trade in assets if they hold heterogeneous expectations for
14. Although "risk" and "uncertainty" are often used interchangeably, the two words are not
synonyms. Finance theorists apply the word "risk" to circumstances where a future outcome is
unknown, but the probability distribution of possible future outcomes is known. Thus a coin toss
is merely risky. Although we do not know whether a tossed coin will come up heads or tails, we
know-and can agree- there is a 50 percent chance of either occurring. "Uncertainty" applies
to situations where the probability distribution itself is unknown, permitting different individu-
als to make differing estimates of probabilities. The stock market, for example, is uncertain as
well as risky.
15. Thus the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), a staple of modern finance,
explicitly assumes that all investors make identical subjective estimates of the likely future risks
and returns associated with individual securities. The CAPhi accordingly takes account of risk
while ignoring uncertainty. Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and
ECfH under Conditions ofDisagreement and Uncertainty, 19:2 CARDOZO L. REv. (1997).
16. The requisite of statistical uncertainty provides a findamental distinction between the
HE approach and the risk-hedging model. This is because trading inspired by differential risk
aversion requires risk, but not uncertainty As long as agents' tastes for risk differ, hedging deals
would be negotiated even between agents who shared identical expectations for the probable
distribution of risky future prices.
The relationship between uncertainty and the information-arbitrage model is more com-
plex. In a sense, arbitrageurs armed with superior information hold differing subjective
estimates of asset values than their less-informed counterparties who are trading for consump-
tion or similar nonspeculative reasons. At the same time, the counterparties do not really
disagree with arbitrageurs' estimates, so much as they deliberately choose to remain relatively
less-informed and avoid the costs of research.
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uncertain future prices. Such disagreement-based trading far more closely
resembles the popular image of speculation than trading inspired by differ-
ences in risk aversion or information investment. For example, the hetero-
geneous expectations (HE) model of trading does not require the
risk-hedging model's awkward assumption that speculators be less risk-
averse than other individuals: Even risk-fearing individuals may speculate if
their subjective expectations differ.
The HE model also explains the otherwise-puzzling phenomena of
speculator-with-speculator trading. Although such trading seems inconsis-
tent with the risk-hedging and information-arbitrage models-both of
which assume that speculators need nonspeculating counterparties to
trade-the example offered above supports the notion of "purely" specu-
lative deals between traders who each hope to reap short-term trading
profits by dealing with the other. Similarly, the HE approach offers a
theoretical explanation for markets where speculators appear, on average,
to suffer trading losses.17 This counterintuitive result can be traced to a
peculiar and important element of the HE model referred to herein as ex
post speculator error.
Let us return to the archetypal case of the bull who expects to reap a $10
per ounce profit from buying gold, and the bear who expects to avoid a $10
per ounce loss by selling. Although bull and bear each expect ex ante wealth
gains of $10 per ounce from their trade, their ex post returns necessarily
average $0.18 Whether gold prices rise, fall, or remain at $500, speculation
on disagreement in a common-value assetl9 is a zero-sum game in which
one player's gain necessarily is balanced by another player's loss.
20
17. Speculator losses are inconsistent with the risk-hedging and information-arbitmge mod-
els, which each predict that speculators on average ought to profit from their trades. Of course,
price volatility (risk) implies that speculators occasionally lose money on a transaction. Over
time, however, a speculator willing to accept risk or to invest in truly superior information
should reap certain profits. In contrast, the HE model also incorporates the common intuition
that speculation involves a high probability of loss for speculators. After all, when two people
trade on disagreeing predictions, at least one must be disappointed.
18. The ex post error characteristic of HE trading can be described as a consequence of
imperfect information that permits uncertainty (subjective disagreement). Given perfect infor-
mation regarding the future, bull and bear both would know whether gold were going to rise
or fall. No trade would occur because if one were willing to buy the other would be unwilling
to sell, and vice versa. Imperfect information permits uncertainty, however, and uncertainty
permits bull and bear to hold differing expectations that lead them to perceive opportunities
to extract trading profits from each other despite the zero-sum nature of such transactions.
19. The phrase "common-value asset" refers to any asset hat agents who share homogene-
ous expectations would value equally. Thus, a payment of money, or a highly liquid financial
instrument reflecting the right to a stream of payments, usually is regarded as a common value
asset on the theory that people attach identical values to money. Noncommon value assets are
assets for which agents have unique tastes, such as mango ice cream or opera tickets. Agents
who share identical expectations for the future may nevertheless display varying willingness to
pay for noncommon value assets.
20. This result is in contrast to hedging trades that redistribute risk, which can be mutually
beneficial to both speculator and nonspeculator ex post as well as seeming mutually beneficial
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When speculators must incur expenses to trade, speculation devolves
from a zero-sum game to a negative-sum game in which the average player
loses money. Suppose, for example, that bull and bear each must pay $2 per
ounce commissions to trade gold. In such a case, although the traders
expect an average ex ante gain of $8 each ($16 total), they necessarily
experience an ex post average loss of -$2 each (-$4 total). Although one
party may ultimately turn a profit on the deal, the loser's loss inevitably will
be more than the winner's gain. For example, if gold rises to $510, the bull
will enjoy an $8 per ounce net gain-outweighed by the bear's $12 net loss.
A. Normative Implications of the Heterogeneous
Expectations Theory
The element of ex post error examined above provides a theoretical expla-
nation of why speculators who seek trading profits in the stock market or
on the futures and options exchanges end up, on average, losing money.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the HE model's prediction of ex post
speculator error may also go far in explaining why noneconomists have
traditionally been hostile toward speculators. In contrast to the risk-hedging
and information-arbitrage models (which predict that speculation serves
efficiency, either by firthering mutually beneficial risk hedging or by im-
proving the accuracy of asset prices), the HE approach implies that specula-
tion can reduce net trader welfare without any compensating benefit from improved
price accuracy. In other words, speculation can be inefficient.
Heterogeneous expectations trading's capacity to harm speculators is
implicit in the element of ex post error examined above. Most obviously,
HE trading harms speculators because it has the perverse effect of de-
creasing their ex post wealth (assuming positive transactions costs). Dis-
agreement-based trading can also, however, harm speculators by
increasing the risk they bear.21 A speculator heavily invested in gold, for
example, can reduce his investment portfolio's exposure to gold market
risk by selling bullion and buying other investments, such as stocks or
real estate.22 If the speculator expects gold prices to rise in the near future,
ex ante. Information arbitrage perhaps should not be described as mutually beneficial, because
rational consumption traders would prefer a market without information arbitrageurs to a
market with them. Information arbitrage does not, however involve ex post error: The con-
sumption traders who trade at a systematic disadvantage relative to information arbitrageurs
decline to invest in information because the costs, to them, outweigh the benefits.
21. See Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Can Increase Risks and Erode
Returns in Financial Markets, 21J. CoRP. L 53, 62 (1995).
22. Because the prices of nongold assets are likely to vary in different patterns from gold
prices (e.g., stock prices rise when gold prices fall), diversifying can reduce the overall risk or
variation in an asset portfolio. See generally Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of
Corpomte Finance 129-74 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing risk-reducing benefits of diversification).
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however, he may buy more gold, thus reducing his diversification and in-
creasing his risk. Thus, HE speculators' (on average) mistakenly perceived
opportunity to profit from their predictions for future prices may tempt
them into accepting risks they would otherwise avoid, just as it tempts
them into incurring transaction costs.2 3
From a social perspective, any harm that speculation might inflict on
speculators might be worth bearing if HE trading provided a compensat-
ing external benefit in the form of more accurate asset prices. Unlike
arbitrage on truly superior information, however, speculation based on
differences of opinion cannot be assumed to produce such an agreeable
result. When two disagreeing speculators trade on the basis of their dif-
fering opinions, at least one must ultimately be proven mistaken. HE trad-
ing by speculators who are as likely to be wrong as right in their belief
they have identified a "mispriced" good or service consequently is as likely
to move prices away from correct levels, as toward them.2 4
B. Why Has the Modern Literature Overlooked the
Heterogeneous Expectations Approach?
The heterogeneous expectations theory of trading accords well with specu-
lation's popular image; it explains a variety of otherwise puzzling empirical
phenomena found in speculative markets; and, perhaps most importantly,
it provides a firm theoretical foundation for the intuition that speculation
can be a nonproductive and potentially self-destructive activity. Why, then,
does conventional economic wisdom overlook the heterogeneous expecta-
23. In effect, speculators' ex post mistaken belief they will earn trading profits creates the
illusion of a "risk premium" that compensates them for increasing their risk exposure.
24. Readers who are interested in more formal expositions of this intuition can consult a
large and growing finance literature on heterogeneous expectations asset pricing models. See,
e.g., William F. Sharpe, Powrrouo THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 104-13 (1970) (chapter
entitled "Disagreement");John Lintner, The Aggregation ofInvestor's DiverseJudgments and Prefer-
ences in Purely Competitive Securities Markets, 4J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALusis 347 (1969); Edward R.
Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151 (1977); Joseph T. Williams,
Capital Asset Prices with Heterogeneous Beliefs, 5J. FIN. EcoN. 219 (1977); RobertJarrow, Heteroge-
neous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equilibrium Asset Prices, 35 J. FIN. 1105 (1980);
Joram Mayshar, On Divergence of Opinion and Imperfections in Capital Markets, 73 AM. EcoN. REv.
114 (1983); Hal R. Varian, Divergence of Opinion in Complete Markets: A Note, 40J. FIN. 309 (1985);
Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law,
99 YALE LJ. 1235 (1990); Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance,
79 CAL. L. REv. 1053; Mordecai Kurz, Asset Prices with Rational Beliefs (Monograph, Center for
Economic Policy Research, Stanford University) (February 1994); Stout, supra note 15. One of
the more interesting implications of this literature is that, when markets are in some form
incomplete or imperfect, the introduction of speculators can in some cases destabilize prices,
leading to a speculative "bubble." See, e.g, Stout, supra note 13 (discussing bubbles); Jack
Treynor, "Bulls, Bears and Market Bubbles" (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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tions model, instead emphasizing risk hedging and information arbitrage
as explanations for speculative trading?25
To the layperson, the notion that subjective disagreement over the future
can inspire speculation may seem obvious. At least one prominent econo-
mist has also suggested that a trading model based on disagreeing expecta-
tions may offer a more accurate account of speculative behavior than do
prevailing models. In 1975 and 1977,Jack Hirshleifer published two articles
presenting a model of speculation driven by what he termed "differential
beliefs."26 Although Hirshleifer did not explore the normative implications
of his disagreement-based approach, his articles clearly set out an attractive
alternative to prevailing theories.27 In the two decades following its publica-
tion, however, Hirshleifer's work on speculation has received relatively little
attention from finance economists, and is virtually never cited by legal
scholars who study speculative markets.2 8 The implications of Hirshleifer's
approach remain largely unrecognized and undeveloped.
It seems plausible that this peculiar neglect can be traced, in part, to a
variety of aspects of the HE approach that are likely to seem unappealing
to disciples of neoclassical economic theory. The HE model refuses to
overlook the messy concept of statistical uncertainty; it heretically suggests
that voluntary exchange is not necessarily mutually beneficial, implying that
paternalistic interference in the choices of consenting adults can produce
welfare gains; it invites observers to judge welfare effects by predictable ex
post net results, rather than individual subjective ex ante expectations; and
perhaps most unpalatably (at least to conservative scholars of the "Chicago
school"), it hints that such capitalist icons as the New York Stock Exchange
and the Chicago Board of Trade may not, necessarily, be efficient.
Modern theorists' curious reluctance to incorporate expectations hetero-
geneity and ex post error into their discussions of speculation also, however,
.25. See Stein, supra note 3, at 1125 (noting that papers on speculation tend "to ignore the
issue of heterogeneous information among market participants"); see, e.g., Hart & Kreps, supra
note 2 at 928-29 (focusing on storage function and assuming speculators have access to the
same information and draw identical inferences); John Leach, Rational Speculation, 99J. POL.
EcoN. 131, 132 (1991) (modeling speculation where all agents place an identical value on an
asset).
Of course, the information-arbitrage model implies heterogeneity in the sense that in-
formed arbitrageurs' expectations differ from uninformed consumption traders' expectations.
This heterogeneity, however, is due to differential information costs rather than statistical
uncertainty. See supra text and notes 14-16, 18 (discussing requisite of uncertainty in heteroge-
neous expectations analysis).
26. Jack Hirshleifer, Speculation and Equilibrium, 89 Q.J. EcoN. 519 (1975);Jack Hirshleifer,
The Theory of Speculation Under Alternative Regimes of Markets, 32 J. FIN. 975 (1977). Hirshleifer
attributes a similar approach to Holbrook Working.
27. I have argued at length elsewhere that a heterogeneous expectations approach may
solve a number of mysteries that have long plagued scholars studying financial markets and
speculative behavior. See, e.g, Stout, supra note 11; Stout, supra note 13; Stout, supra note 15;
and Stout, supra note 11.
28. A recent search of the LEXIS "lawrev" database did not uncover a single citation to
either of Hirshleifer's articles on speculation.
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appears to spring from a more thoughtful source, A few years after Hirsh-
leifer published his work on speculation, a number of prominent game
theorists published papers that criticized the notion of disagreement-based
trading as theoretically flawed. Indeed, these papers went further they
argued that individuals who share rational expectations would never trade
on disagreement.29 It is perhaps not too much of an exaggeration to suggest
that in the wake of this result, the notion that speculation might reflect
trading on subjective disagreement seemed to sink from the finance litera-
ture without a trace.3 0
IV. THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS CRITIQUE
OF THE HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS MODEL
To noneconomists, the idea that disagreeing predictions drive speculation
may seem so logical as to be obvious. By the same token, game theorists'
claim that people with rational expectations hould never trade on disagree-
ment seems a bit absurd. The "no-trade" theorems rest, however, on the
plausible intuition that people extract infornationfroin others'willingness to trade
with them.3 1 In other words, rational individuals who estimate uncertain
probabilities from limited information recognize that their estimates are
imperfect and are willing to revise them in the face of another's disagree-
ment.
Consider the following simple example of how revising expectations in
light of another's disagreement can halt trading. Suppose John and Mary
are given an urn containing four marbles, two white and two black. They
each draw a marble from the urn and inspect it without showing it to the
other. John draws a white marble, and Mary draws a black. John and Mary
now each have private information that leads them to revise their estimates
of the probable color of the third marble drawn from the urn. John's
private information suggests a two-thirds chance that the third marble will
29. See, e.g., Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 ANNALS STAT. 1236 (1976); John D.
Geanakoplos & Heraklis N1. Polmarchkis, We Can't Disagree Forever, 28 J. EcoN. THEORY 192
(1982); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge, 26J. EcoN.
THEORY 17 (1982); Jean Tirole, On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations, 50
ECONOMEIUCA 1163 (1982).
30. Interestingly, the idea that mistaken disagreement with market price may inspire some
trading has recently reappeared in form of "noise theory," which postulates that some subset
of traders in the market suffer from cognitive defects that make them value securities irration-
ally. Curiously, noise theorists generally cite neither Hirshleifer nor his critics. See, e.g., J.
Bradford De Long et al., The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN. 681
(1989);J. Bradford De Long, et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98J. POL EcoN. 703
(1990); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise TraderApproach toFinanceJ. EcoN.
PERSP. (Spring 1990), 19; John Y Campbell & Albert S. Kyle, Smart Money, Noise Trading, and
Stock Price Behaviour, 60 REv. EcoN. STUD. 1 (1993).
31. The underlying idea has sometimes been termed the "Groucho Marx Theorem" in
honor of Groucho's observation that he would never want to belong to any club that would
have him as a member.
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be black (he knows he has already removed one of the whites). Mary
estimates a two-thirds chance the third draw will be white (she knows she
has removed one of the black marbles).
Will John's and Mary's disagreeing estimates lead them to bet (that is,
trade) against each other? John should know that if Mary offers to bet on
white, that is because she has drawn a black marble. Similarly, Mary should
infer from John's willingness to bet on black that lie has drawn a white
marble. Each should realize that there is one white and one black marble
remaining in the urn. Because they now both estimate a 50-50 probability that the
third draw will be white or black, John and Mary will not trade.32
As this example illustrates, the rational expectations no-trade result rests
on the notion that a bull should hesitate to buy once he learns the bear is
willing to sell, and vice versa. In effect, each trader asks of him- or herself:
"What does my counterparty know that I don't?" It seems likely that this sort
of process does occur to some extent in markets, and that the recognition
that other traders in the market may have better information discourages
many would-be speculators.
Yet even the most casual empiricism suggests that the extreme result of
the no-trade theorem does not hold true. Gamblers still bet at racetracks;
investment fund managers still trade derivatives believing they can predict
interest rates; stockbrokers still dine daily on the commissions paid by
investors hoping to "beat the market." Reality does not conform to rational
expectations theory's predictions, at least in the extreme form of the no-
trade theorems. That observation in turn suggests a need to reexamine
theory.
V. THEORETICAL WEAKNESSES OF RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS
Closer inspection of the rational expectations prediction that people
should not speculate on disagreement reveals two important considerations
that should lead any carefil observer to discount its value in understanding
speculative markets. The first consideration is theoretical. In reaching its
counterintuitive result, the no-trade theorem relies on several strong-and
unlikely-assumptions. Among these are the assumptions of concordant
beliefs (or uniform prior beliefs) and common knowledge.
The term "concordant beliefs" means that all rational agents process
information in an identical fashion and would reach the same conclusion
given the same data. (As will be discussed below, the concordant beliefs
assumption in turn assumes that people share uniform prior beliefs about
probabilities, beliefs they only revise in light of new data). An event is said
32. Unless, of course, they have a taste for risk.
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to be "common knowledge" if all agents know it, all agents know that all
agents know it, and so on in infinite regress.
Taken together, concordant beliefs and common knowledge produce the
rational expectations result that bulls and bears refuse to trade. Although a
bull might initially believe gold is likely to rise in price, if it is common
knowledge that all agents share concordant beliefs, the bull also will believe
that the bear processes information just as he does, and so would not be
willing to sell unless the bear had access to private negative information that
would lead the bull, also, to conclude gold was overpriced. The bull conse-
quently revises his initial optimistic estimate of gold downwards to reflect
the bear's pessimism, while the bear similarly revises her initial pessimistic
estimate upwards in the light of the bull's optimism. The final result is that
bull and bear come to agree in their estimates, and no trade occurs.
This result is both elegant and provocative. It is also, hweve quite fragile.
If the assumptions of concordant beliefs and common knowledge are vio-
lated, the no-trade result does not survive. And while concordant beliefs
and common knowledge are useful conventions to game theorists trying to
model behavior under conditions of uncertainty, they seem highly unlikely to
apply in most markets.
A. The Unlikeliness of Concordant Beliefs (Uniform Priors)
The assumption of concordant beliefs-that rational agents process similar
information similarly--seems, at first, plausible. It necessarily relies, how-
ever, on the Bayesian convention that assumes that agents trying to predict
future events all start with identical prior probability estimates which they
then revise in light of sample information. Recall the example ofJohn and
Mary drawing marbles from an urn. In that example, John and Mary were
both told that the urn contained two black and two white marbles. They
thus shared an initial common prior belief about the probability of drawing
white or black.
The scenario changes dramatically if we assume that, before their initial
draw, John and Mary held differing prior beliefs about the proportions of
white and black marbles in the urn. Suppose that John initially believes
there are three white marbles and one black marble in the urn. Mary,
however, believes there are three black and one white. IfJohn draws a black
marble, he now will estimate a 100 percent probability that the third marble
drawn will be white. If Mary draws a white, she will estimate a 100 percent
probability that the third marble will be black. Might John's and Mary's
disagreeing estimates lead them to bet against each other on the third
draw?
The answer now is yes. Given John's prior beliefs, he could now interpret
Mary's willingness to bet on black as a sign that she drew a white marble in
the first round, and thus thinks there is still some possibility of drawing a
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black marble from the urn. (John, having drawn a black marble, thinks he
knows better). Mary in turn can perceive John's willingness to bet on white
as a signal that he drew a black marble in the first draw, and does not know
(as she thinks she does) that no white marbles remain in the urn. Thus,
both John and Mary may revise their estimates to account for the possibility
that their counterparty has private information. Even after doing so, however
they may each want to trade, because of the possibility that their disagreement springs
from the other's (supposedly mistaken) differingprio
The net result is that, when agents' priors differ, the assumption of
concordant beliefs does not hold: Rational agents may draw differing con-
clusions from similar data. And it seems likely that peoples' priors do differ.
The Bayesian assumption that people share identical priors, while mathe-
matically convenient, lacks either a theoretical or an empirical foundation.
Indeed, it makes sense only if knowledge and belief are innate (and identically
so).33 If knowledge is a product of experience, different individuals' priors
will be determined by their differing initial experiences-in effect, their
first draws from the urn. Hence, it seems more plausible to assume that
individuals have differing, randomly generated priors, than it is to assume
they start out with uniform priors.
That observation in turn suggests that insight might be gained from a
rational expectations model that examines trading behavior when people
have randomly generated prior beliefs. Yet this approach raises its own prob-
lems. Under Bayesian conventions, the theorist (or speculator) who attempts
to model trading among individuals assuming randomly generated priors
must still make some assumptions both about he distribution of those subjec-
tive priors, and about heir mean or average. In other words, we must start
with some priors about priors. This sort of theoretical bootstrapping, unfor-
tunately, serves mathematical convenience while sacrificing predictive accu-
racy. As a result, rational expectations models that presume concordant
beliefs and either uniform priors, or some assumed distribution of randomly
generated priors, cannot be relied upon to predictbehavior in a world where
individuals' prior beliefs differ in ways that are undeterminable a priori.
B. The Unlikeliness of Common Knowledge
The discussion above suggests that, when beliefs are not "concordant,"
disagreement-based trading may be consistent with rational expectations. A
similar result obtains if people share concordant beliefs, but this fact is not
"common knowledge."
Game theorists describe information as common knowledge if all poten-
33. It can be argued, however, that different individuals' priors may tend to converge over
time as they gain experience by repeatedly drawing from the same urn (the world) and revise
their estimates. This approach suggests the value of a "learning" model of trading behavior. See
infra Part VIA. (learning model).
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tial traders know it, all potential traders know all potential traders know it,
all know that all know that all know it, and so on.3 Common knowledge of
concordant beliefs is essential to the no-trade result because, otherwise,
Mary might interpret John's willingness to bet against her as a signal that
John has mistaken priors or is irrational, rather than a signal thatJohn has
private information that should lead Mary to revise her estimates as well. In
other words, trading on disagreement becomes rational when traders be-
lieve others in the market may be mistaken or irrational.
Moreover, it is not enough simply to assume that traders have common
knowledge that they share concordant beliefs (uniform priors). To reach
the no-trade result, traders must also have common knowledge that their
posterior beliefs differ-that is, that private information has caused them to
revise their estimates away from the uniform prior. Thus, bullish John will
only hesitate to buy from Mary if he believes her motive for selling is
bearishness. If he thinks Mary is selling for some other reason-perhaps he
simply needs the money-John will not revise his own beliefs simply because
Mary is willing to trade.
In the real world, of course, traders lack common knowledge either of
other traders' prior, or their posterior, beliefs. Given the realities of such
common and cognition-impairing conditions as alcoholism, Alzheimer's dis-
ease, and bipolar disease (just to name a few), it seems unreasonable for a
trader to presume that all other traders are rational and incapable of error.
Moreover, in estimating others' posterior beliefs it is impossible for traders to
discern their counterparties' motives with certainty. Even in such highly
speculative arenas as the stock markets or futures and options exchanges, a
significant portion of traders are in the market for reasons other than dis-
agreement with market prices-e.g., because of changing risk or consump-
tion preferences, to raise funds, or for tax or other strategic reasons.
The assumption of common knowledge both of traders' uniform priors,
and of their differing posteriors, thus is highly unrealistic. That observation
carries important implications for the wisdom of assuming the no-trade
result applies to actual markets. In real markets, common knowledge does
not exist. And when common knowledge does not exist, the no-trade result
does not survive.
C. Conclusion: Theoretical Implausibility of the No-Trade Result
In the wake of the publication of the no-trade theorems, a consensus eems
to have developed in the finance culture that trading on differing subjective
estimates of probabilities must be "irrational."35 Close examination of the
34. Milgrom & Stokey, supra note 29, at 18. .
35. See, e.g., Tirole, supra note 29 at 1164 (trading on subjective disagreement irrational);
Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713, 722-24 (same); see
also supra note 30 ("noise" theorists who presume some speculators are irrational).
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rational expectations no-trade result suggests, however, that the label "ra-
tional expectations" is something of a misnomer. Disagreement-based trad-
ing may indeed be inconsistent with rational expectations, so defined. It may
not, however, be inconsistent with rationality.
Given certain realistic assumptions, even traders who are rational in a
very strict sense may trade on disagreeing predictions. This is because the
no-trade result necessarily relies upon a number of strong - and empiri-
cally implausible-underlying assumptions. If these assumptions are vio-
lated, rational agents certainly may still extract information from the
price-taking behavior of others in the market, and revise their initial expec-
tations to some degree. But in a world where traders start from different
priors, lack common knowledge of uniform priors, or lack common knowl-
edge of differing posteriors, their revisions are likely to be only partial.
Some degree of trading on disagreement will persist. In other words, the
no-trade result is not robust.36
Indeed, any other suggestion would seem flatly contradicted by the data.
Overwhelming evidence indicates that apparently normal people often
invest substantial resources on the basis of disagreement. (The ongoing
academic debate over the meaning and consequences of speculation is, of
course, itself a case in point.) If trading on disagreement is inconsistent with
rational expectations, this form of "irrationality" appears both endemic and
predictable.
That observation in turn sets the stage for examining a second important
consideration that cuts against relying on the no-trade theorem as a
grounds for rejecting the notion that people trade on disagreement. At the
level of theory, it is not clear whether (absent concordant beliefs and
common knowledge) rational traders would decline to trade on the basis of
their differing subjective expectations for future price changes. The issue
may be purely academic, however. Perhaps rational traders should not
trade. A growing body of empirical evidence suggests, however, that people
are not rational.
VI. EMPIRICAL WEAKNESSES OF THE RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS MODEL
The discussion above suggests that, in a static model, individuals who lack
concordant beliefs and common knowledge may rationally choose to trade
with each other on the basis of their disagreeing predictions for an uncer-
tain future. What happens, however, in a dynamic system where individuals
36. SeeJack HirshIcifer, Two Models of Speculation and Information, in TIME, UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORATIoN 292-99 (Jack Hirshleifer ed., 1989); Lymn A. Stout, Agreeing to Disagree over
Excessive Trading, 81 VA. L REv. 751 (1995).
Irrational Expectations 243
gather information and trade not once, but on several successive occasions?
In other words, should trading on heterogeneous expectations persist over
time?
A. Learned Rational Expectations
Perhaps not. It can be argued that, where people gather information and
trade repeatedly, conditions that approximate concordant beliefs and
common knowledge may develop over time, and the apparently implau-
sible assumptions underlying the no-trade result become more plausible.
Consider, for example, the assumption that would-be speculators deciding
whether to trade on private information begin with uniform prior beliefs
about the probabilities of events in the world. If knowledge is based on
experience, the notion that people share uniform priors makes little
sense. There is considerable variation in the world, and different people's
initial experiences (that is, their first draws from the urn) are likely to
vary considerably. Over time, however, as rational individuals collect more
information and gain more experience in the world (make more draws
from the same urn), their subjective estimates of the probabilities of
events may become more similar. In other words, even if traders start
out with different priors, as they gain experience their beliefs may become
more concordant.
A similar process can create conditions approximating the game theo-
rists' assumption of common knowledge. In a static model, individuals who
lack common knowledge of other traders' uniform priors and differing
posteriors may trade on private information in the belief either that their
counterparties' priors are mistaken, or that their counterparty is trading for
reasons that have nothing to do with private information. Over time, how-
ever, speculators who trade repeatedly may gain experience (especially if
they lose money) that leads them to accord greater respect for the possibil-
ity that others' priors are more accurate than their own, and also to get a
better sense of the likelihood that their counterparty's trade is also moti-
vated by private information (rather than changing consumption prefer-
ences or risk aversion). The result is that, even if people do not start out
with "rational expectations," over time their behavior may evolve until it
approximates rational expectations.
There is evidence, in fact, that people do learn to revise their subjective
estimates of value in light of others' disagreement. However, they seem
to learn slowly and incompletely. A market composed only of brilliant
and perfectly rational traders might indeed come quickly to approximate
the rational expectations result, so that trading on disagreement swiftly
comes to a halt. Unfortunately, it appears that most of us are not that
smart.
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B. The Winner's Curse
The question of whether and how quickly people learn to revise their
subjective expectations in light of others' disagreement has been studied
most closely in the context of the "winner's curse" that affects auctions in
which an asset is sold to the highest bidder. Extensive evidence indicates
that in auctions of common-value assets (that is, assets which all the auction
participants would value equally given the same information) ,7 the win-
ning bidder tends to pay too much. In other words, the actual value of the
auctioned asset urns out to be less than the auction price. Thus the winner
is "cursed."3
This peculiar phenomenon can be explained as follows. When auction
participants are bidding for a common-value asset-say, oil companies are
bidding for the right to drill for oil on a particular parcel of land-their
estimates of value will be based in part on private information, such as the
reports prepared by each company's geologists. Different geologists will
make differing estimates. If errors are unbiased, the best estimate of the
value of the parcel will be an average of all the geologists' estimates. The
average estimate will not win the auction, however. Rather, it is the most
optimistic bid that "wins."
Auction bidders with rational expectations should realize that, if they win
the auction, this is evidence that all the other participants' private informa-
tion indicates that their bid is too high. They also should realize they can
avoid the winner's curse if they discount their bid somewhat to take account
of the possibility that they might win.39 The net result is that all bidders
should discount their bids. While the average bid may now fall below the best
estimate of the auctioned asset's value, the winner avoids the curse.
C. Empirical Evidence on the Winner's Curse and Learned
Rational Expectations
Do auction bidders in fact follow the rational expectations pattern and
avoid the winner's curse? The answer seems to be "not entirely." Extensive
evidence from both experimental and field studies suggests that, at least
initially, individuals invited to participate in an auction of a common-value
asset fail to revise their bids enough to avoid the curse. For example, in one
experiment, graduate students were asked to bid on jars of coins. Each of
the jars contained coins with a total value of $8. The average bid was $5.13,
suggesting either that the students were extremely risk-averse, or that (in
accord with rational expectations theory) they were revising their bids
37. See supra note 19 (common-value assets).
38. See generally Richard H. Thaler THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMAUES OF
EcoNoMIc LIFE 50-62 (1992).
39. Id. at 51, 61, & n.10 (winner's curse inconsistent with rational expectations).
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downward to account for the possibility that their fellow students might
disagree with their estimates, and they might win the auction. But their
revisions were at best partial; the average winning bid was $10.01, resulting
in a $2.01 loss to the auction winner.40
Of course, instances of this nature-that is, cases where people fall prey
to the winner's curse when they first participate in an auction-may not
necessarily be inconsistent with rationality, because the conditions of con-
cordant beliefs and common knowledge may not apply. However, when
rational agents participate in auctions repeatedly, conditions that closely
resemble concordant beliefs and common knowledge may develop over
time. In other words, people should learn enough about their own and
others' prior and posterior estimates from trading that they eventually
come to discount their bids fully and accurately.
Do auction bidders actually follow this "learned rational expectations"
pattern and avoid the winner's curse? Again, the answer seems to be no.
Some people can, and do, learn. Unfortunately, most learn slowly, and some
people appear not to learn at alL
In one typical study, 69 M.B.A. students at Northwestern University were
presented with a winner's-curse-like problem with financial rewards. The
problem was repeated 20 times, with feedback after each trial. Of the 69
students, only 5 learned to avoid the curse (on average, after 8 trials). There
was no evidence of learning among the other 64. Indeed, in the last few
trials, the other 64 students did less well in avoiding the curse than they had
in previous trials.41
Only an economist is likely to be shocked by such results. Consider the
difficulty of the problem faced by auction bidders who attempt a Bayesian
revision of their own subjective estimates to take account of others' dis-
agreement. Bidders must draw conclusions about their own and other
bidders' priors; the rationality of the competing bidders; and the nature
and extent of the other bidders' subjective disagreement. Such calculations
are difficult enough in the sterile atmosphere of an M.B.A. classroom where
the auction bidders are few in number, relatively homogeneous, and bid-
ding on a common-value asset for which no bidder is likely to have a unique
taste or preference. Imagine how much more difficult the problem be-
comes in markets of thousands of diverse participants, many of whom may
be trading for any number of reasons unrelated to their disagreement with
market price. Perhaps a Cray supercomputer, if given enough information,
could make such a calculation quickly and accurately. For the average Homo
sapiens, however, the sheer difficulty of such a feat seems likely to discourage
even the attempt. Instead, the average "irrational" trader falls back on rules
of thumb, conventional wisdom, and the lessons of bitter experience.
In sum, the notion that rational individuals should never trade on dis-
40. Id. at 52.
41. Thaler, supra note 40, at 54-55.
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agreeing subjective predictions for an uncertain future rests on heroic
assumptions about people's cognitive abilities, assumptions that are both
fundamentally and obviously incorrect. If people had rational expectations,
a chess match would consist of two opponants facing each other briefly
before one concedes. In the real world, even grand masters may play for
hours with the final outcome in doubt. If chess grand masters cannot
conform to the rational expectations model, it seems highly unlikely that
the rest of us can, either.
VII. CONCLUSION
Scholars frequently intone the mantra that economic theory can be a
"useful tool" for analyzing problems of law and policy. Even the best tool
can be misused, however. In their quest to describe and, increasingly,
mathematically model human behavior, economists often grossly simplify a
complex reality. Usually such simplification does no harm. In other cases,
however, the result can be a caricature that does more to hinder than to
promote our understanding of markets.
This paper explores one such instance. Contemporary theoretical discus-
sions of speculation tend to focus exclusively on the risk-hedging and
information-arbitrage models of speculative trading. Although these mod-
els certainly explain some forms of trading, a third alternative-the hetero-
geneous expectations model-seems in many ways to mirror far more
closely the common understanding of what is meant by "speculation."
Nevertheless, the heterogeneous expectations approach has met with a cool
reception among theorists, primarily because it appears inconsistent with
rational expectations analysis.
The rational expectations approach clearly offers a variety of useful
insights into human and market behavior. When applied to speculative
trading, however, the rational expectations model appears both theoreti-
cally and empirically flawed. However elegant the no-trade theorems might
be, at the practical level their utility in understanding speculative markets
seems quite limited. Unfortunately, modern commentators writing on fi-
nancial markets seem to have seized upon the rational expectations ap-
proach with a greater sense of its benefits than of its limitations. The result
has been a persistent and widespread misunderstanding of the nature and
consequences of speculation.
That observation in turn suggests that much might be gained from
incorporating the reality of disagreement into our analysis of speculative
markets. Recent interest in noise-trading theory,42 and in heterogeneous
expectations-based asset pricing models,43 suggests that finance theorists
42. See sources cited supra note 30.
43. See sources cited supra note 24.
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finally may be starting to look in this direction. Unfortunately, we may have
lost many years in our quest to understand financial markets by running
down the dead end of rational expectations.
What can explain this (with the benefit of hindsight) obvious mistake?
Perhaps economists themselves lack rational expectations, and so work long
and hard to create models that presume that other people understand
instantly what took the economist years to figure out. But another reason
may be that economics has evolved away from being a dismal "science" -
that is, an inquiry into the nature of the world-and toward becoming a
branch of mathematics where models are treasured for their elegance,
charm, and tractability, rather than their ability to predict behavior. That is
fine for economists. Legal scholars and policymakers should think twice,
however, before presuming that economic models mirror real markets.
